

Extract from Interrogation of TOGO, Shigenori - 19 March 1946.

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- Q. Do you have any knowledge of any conclusion reached by TOJO, SUZUKI, HOSHINO and the other members of the TOJO clique to start war around October 10 or 15 prior to the fall of the 3rd KONOYE Cabinet.
- A. I know of no such decision, but from what I have learned since about the third year of the war from Prince KONOYE, and from his so-called memoirs since the termination of the war, TOJO was very anxious to arrive at an early decision on the basis of the September 6 decisions with the prospect that the negotiations were useless. From what I recall of the conversation with KONOYE, MUTO, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, had said to KONOYE that if the Prime Minister opposed war, the Prime Minister could be changed at any time, but if the navy objected to war, then there could be no war, since the navy is saying that it leaves everything up to the decision of the Prime Minister, you can not get anywhere. So the question is to get the navy to decide. So it is necessary to make clear the navy's views.

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- Q. What did you say at the time of your conversation with OTT regarding what was expected of Germany.
- A. Although I have to brush up on my memory, I recall that the main point of interest so far as I was concerned was what the attitude of Germany would be in case the negotiations failed. As I recall, OTT said, as his personal opinion, that Germany would stand on the side of Japan and assist Japan.
- A. (continuation after recess)
Going back to the question relative to November 25, when you said that I met General OTT, I recollect in my memory during the recess, and I have recalled the following: On November 25 the feeling was rather strong that the Japanese modus vivendi would be acceptable to the United States, that even the formula for a treaty had been drafted and had been telegraphed to Washington on that very day. The feeling that such a feeling was entertained by those outsiders who visited the Japanese Embassy in Washington,

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and such observations were also being made in London as well as elsewhere. Such being the expectation, the army went so far as to make an exorbitant request with respect to the supply of gasoline, which was taken up in point two of "Proposition B", and the matter was brought to the Foreign Office. When I was informed of this army request for such a heavy order for gasoline, I told my subordinate officer that such a demand could not be accepted because it would sabotage the efforts toward arriving at a successful conclusion of the negotiations, and that if any request is made it should be within reasonable limits, that is, that a figure averaging Japan's gasoline needs over a period of years should be requested and not such an exorbitant quantity. In order to make the negotiations a success, the Japanese must approach the matter with more sincerity, and furthermore it would be in violation of the spirit of the decision of the Imperial Conference which was to seek a successful settlement; and I had that request rejected and turned back to the military.

This should explain the fact that there was no idea on that day of any failure of the negotiations, and although it may not be a very precise picture, it would explain the general situation. As far as the army was concerned, it may be considered in the light of your observation, attempt at sabotage of the negotiations on the part of the army. But the Foreign Office can not see clearly to what extent this represented the army's views, what latitude of the army's views, or at how high a level. That matter was to have been brought to the Foreign Office by the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, General MUTO. At that time one of the most urgent and important considerations was that of petroleum. What to do with the petroleum question in case the negotiations ended in failure, and what to do with the question in case the negotiations succeeded.

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- Q. In regard to the question of gasoline, what was the demand in quantity that MUTO requested that you should make of the United States.
- A. I do not recall the exact figures, but I do recall that the quantity was much greater than the ordinary imports.

- Q. What would be the reason that the military should desire such large quantities of gasoline.
- A. The military as a matter of course, desired being well supplied and stocked insofar as preparations were concerned; and, therefore, submitted such an exorbitant request. If this question were viewed from the American point of view, it was even publicly stated by President ROOSEVELT and Assistant Secretary of State BERLE that if oil imports into Japan were stopped, it would lead to war. And the American stand on the matter was that by limiting oil supplies to Japan, Japanese strength would be weakened. Therefore, the making of such a demand upon the United States would naturally be rejected and make virtually impossible the arriving at a successful settlement. That is the main and crucial point of the question.

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- Q. Did TOJO, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO, and the others connected with TOJO, reveal at any time other than this that they wished to sabotage successful negotiations between the United States and Japan.

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- A. The actual situation was that whenever any question arose and views were expressed by the army, it has been very difficult to know or to confirm to what extent it represented the army. That was one of the principal difficulties of the Foreign Office, to confirm whether, for instance, the request brought by MUTO on the gasoline question represented what latitude or level of the army.

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千九百四十六年三月十九日一東郷茂徳ノ訓問ヨリ
披奉。

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問、貴方ハ第三次近衛内閣ノ例レル前十月十日又
ハ十三日頃眞律、鈴木、星野及ヒ東條閣ノ他
ノ人々ニヨリ戦争ヲ治メント一決セシ事ニ關
シ何等カノ情報ヲ持ツテ居リマスカ。
答、私ハ新カル決定ニ關シテハ尙モ知リマセン、
然シ開戦後ノ三年目頃近衛公カラ聞イタ所ニ
依リ又戦争終決後同氏ノ所請備忘録ニヨリ、
東條ハ會談ハ無空デアルト云フ見透シカラ早
急九月六日ノ決定ニ至イタ決定ニ達セント非
常ニ焦慮シテ居タコトラ知リマシタ。近衛公
トノ會談ヲ思ヒ出シマスト、武蔵野局長ハ
近衛公ニ同ツテ「若シ總理大臣ガ戦争ニ反対
スルアラバ何時デモ總理大臣ヲ更迭セシメル
事可能デアル、併シ若シ海軍ガ戦争ニ反対ス
ルアラバ戦争ハ起ランデシヨウ、海軍ハ總テ
ヲ總理大臣ノ決心ニ任スト云ツテ居ルカラド
ウスル事モ出来マセン。ソコデ問題ハ海軍ニ
決定サセルトイフ事デス。此デ海軍ノ意見ヲ
睨視ニスル必要ガアリマス、」ト言ハレタソ

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2.

ウデス

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問、貴方へ何ヲ獨逸ニ期待シテ居ルカニ問シ「オ
ット」／＼／＼／＼トノ會談ノ時何ヲ言ブレマシ
タカ。

答、私ハ私ノ記憶ヲ呼ビ起サテケレバナリマセン
ガ私ノ關スル限リ私ノ記憶スル所デハ問題ノ
中心ハ交渉ガ不調ニ終ツタ場合獨逸ハ如何ナ
ル態度ニ出ツルダロウカト云フ事デス。私ノ
記憶ニ依レバオットハ彼個人ノ意見トシテ獨
逸ハ日本ニ加擔シ日本ヲ援助スルダラウト述
ベマシタ。

答（休憩後ノ續）私ガオット將軍ニ會見シタト貴
方ノ云ハレル十一月二十五日ニ關スル質問ニ
長リマシテ、私ハ休憩時間中私ノ記憶ヲ取リ
長シマシタ、而シテ次ノ事ヲ思ヒ出シマシタ、
即チ拾壹月二十五日ニハ日本側ノ假條約ハ米
國ニヨリ受諾サレルデアラウ、條約ノ爲テラ
原案スラモ起草サレ、而モ其ノ二十五日ニワ
シントン府ニ之ガ打電サレタアドトイフ見方
ガ寧ロ強クテリマシタ、新ノ如キ感ジガワシ
ントンニ於ケル日本大使館ヲ訪レタ局長者ニ
ヨリ抱カレアイマシタ、又新クノ如キ觀察ベ

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3.

倫敦並ニ他ノ所ニ於テモ亦行ハレテイマシタ、
新クノ如キ期待ガ抱カレシガ爲ニ陸軍ベ「提
案B」ノ第二項ニ取リエゲラレタガソリンノ
供給ニ關シ法外ノ要求ヲ爲スニ至リ、其問題
ハ外務省ニ持込マレタノデアリマシタ。

此ノ陸軍ノガソリンニ付テノ施大ナ註文ニ對
スル要求ヲ知ツタ時ニ私ハ部下ノ者ニ斯ノ如
キ要求ハ交渉ヲ妥結ニ導カントスル努力ヲ圖
害スルモノデアルカラ密議シ疑イコト、及ビ
ガソリンニ關シテ何等カノ要求ヲ爲ス場合ニ
ハ其ハ妥當ナ範圍内デ即チ所議ナ法外ナ致意
デナク數年間ノ平均日本ノ需量ヲ要求スベ
キデアルトイフコトヲ告ゲマシタ、會談ヲ成
功サセンガ爲ニハ日本側ハ更ニ一層故意ヲ以
テ此問題ニ臨ムベキデアリ且ツ斯ノ如キ要求
ハ國籍ヲ解決ヲ念願トスル御前會議ノ精神ニ
悖ルモノデアル。ソコデ私ハ石ノ要求ヲ拒絶
シ軍部ヘ返送シマシタ、

是ガアノ當日交渉不調ナドトイフコトハ何等
考ヘテイナカツタト云フ事實ヲ語ルモノデア
リマセウ、尙之ハ餘リ明確デハアリマセンガ
一般ノ情勢ヲ説明スルニ足ルモノト思ヒマス。
陸軍ニ關スル限リ貴殿ノ觀察サレシ如ク陸軍

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トシテハ交渉妨害ヲ企圖シタモノト秀ルコト
モ出来マセウ。併シ外務省トシテハ此ノ提案
ガ如何アル程度マデ國算ノ意圖ヲ表現シテキ
ルモノカ、其ガ如何アル経緯ノモノデアリシ
カ又下ノ程度迄上ニ及ンデイルノカ如何然致シ
マセン。其ノ問題ハ國算省軍務局長武蔵少將
カラ外務省ニ廻附スル書デアツタノデス。其
ノ當時最も緊急且ツ重大アル問題ノ一ハ石油
ノ問題デアリマシタ。即チ石シ會談ガ失敗ニ
終ツタ際ニハ石油問題ヲ如何ニ處理スベキカ
尙若シ會談ガ成功ニ終ツタ場合ニハ同問題ノ
處理方法如何

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問、ガソリンノ件ニ關シ武蔵ガ真方ニ乘門ニ要求
スル様ニ云フタ數量ハ如何アル程度ノモノデ
アリマシタカ、

答、私ハ正確ナ數字ヲ思ヒ出セマセンガ其ノ數量
ハ普通輸入量ヨリハ非常ニ大キテモノデアツ
タ事ヲ記憶シテ后リマス。

問、軍部ガ斯ル多量ノガソリンヲ要求シタノハ何
ノ理由ニ依ルノデセウカ。

答、勿論軍部ハ準備ニ關スル限り石油ガ充分ニ供

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給サレ且時私サレテアルコトラ希望シタデシ
ヨウ。其レガ爲ニ新ノ如キ在外ノ要ヲ提出
シタノデシヨウ。若シ此ノ問題ガ米國ノ見地
カラ顧前サレルテラバ、其レハルーズベルト

/Roosevelt/ 大統領及國務次官バール/Baile

ガ公然言明シタ様ニ「若シ石油ヲ日本ニ輸入
スルコトラ禁止スルテラバソレハ直ニ戦争ヲ
助長スルコトトアラウ。又此ノ問題ニ對スル
米國側ノ態度ハ石油ノ供給ヲ制限スルコトニ
ヨリ日本ノ力ハ弱メラルルデアラウトイフノ
デアリマシタ、デアルカラ米國ニ對スル新カ
ル要求ハ勿論拒否サレル所トアリ、然イテ妥
協妥結ヲ事實不可能ニ修ヘラセルノデアリマ
セウ。即チ是レハ問題ノ核心デアリ重大テ妥
協デアリマス。

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岡、東條、鈴木、星野、武蔵及東條一隊ノ他ノ人
ガ此事以外曾テ何カ日米間ノ交渉ガ妥結ヘ同
ツテ進捗スルコトラ妨害セントノ意圖ヲ漏ラ
シタコトガアリマスカ

答、實際ノ情勢ハ何時デモ此ノ問題ガ如何ニ意見ガ
國算ニ依リ説明サレタ時ニ其レガ如何ナル程

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度迄監軍ヲ代表シテイルモノデアアルカラ知リ
且ツ其ヲ確メルコトガ非常ニ困難デアリマシ
タ。是レ即チ外務省ニトツテ主テル困難ノ一デ
アリマシタ、例ヘバガソリン問題ニ關シ武蔵ニ
依テ寄ラサレタ要求ガ從ト積ニドノ範圍迄監
軍側ノ意圖ヲ示スモノデアアルカ此ノ點ヲ確メ
ル事ハ非常ニ困難デアリマシタ。